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INTRODUCTION
1

In Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway. Co., the Eighth
Circuit split from two circuit courts when it adopted a new stance
2
3
on the rule of unanimity, dealing with removal based on a federal
4
5
question. Specifically, the court strayed from its prior precedent
when it held that representation in a removing defendant’s
notice—stating that its codefendants consented to the removal—
6
satisfies the United States Code’s unanimity requirement. As part
of its reasoning, the Eighth Circuit held that because the defendant
who gives consent on behalf of the codefendants is subject to Rule
7
11 sanctions, policy considerations support the validity of the
8
consent.
This note begins by exploring the history, development, and
construction of removal and the rule of unanimity in the United
9
States. The note will then discuss the development of the rule of
unanimity’s consent requirement as it has been used by the circuit

1. 785 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2015).
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012). The rule of unanimity requires all
defendants to join in or consent to removal from a state court on any civil action.
Id.
3. “Removal” is the process of allowing a defendant who has been sued in
state court the opportunity to “substitute a federal forum for the state court
originally selected by the plaintiff.” 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2008).
4. See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1186–88 (explaining that the Eighth Circuit will
now split away from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d
298, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) as well as the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Getty Oil Corp. v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988)).
5. See Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir.
2012) (“We also emphasize that non-removing defendants who wish to evince
consent to removal should either sign the notice of removal or file a timely and
unequivocal consent to such course of conduct.”).
6. See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1188.
7. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (explaining that sanctions may result when a party
submits a pleading or motion to the court that includes assertions that lack
evidentiary support).
8. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187 (“The potential for Rule 11 sanctions and a
codefendant’s opportunity to alert the court to any falsities in the removing
defendant’s notice serve as safeguards to prevent removing defendants from
making false representations of unanimous consent and forcing codefendants into
a federal forum against their will.”).
9. See infra Part II.
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courts. Next, this note will analyze an important case from the
11
splitting Seventh Circuit court. Following the reasoning of the
Seventh Circuit, this note will explain the facts of Griffioen and
12
examine the reasoning of the majority opinion. Next, using
statutory interpretation and policy implications brought about by
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the note will analyze the
Eighth Circuit’s decision, showing that the court correctly veered
away from its own prior decisions and the precedent set by the
Seventh Circuit when it held that a sole defendant may give
13
consent for codefendants. Finally, this note concludes by
contending that although the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Griffioen
was correct, the holding may have paved the way for defendants to
exploit the rule of unanimity in order to force a non-consenting
14
defendant into a federal forum against his or her will.
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW
A.

A Brief History of Removal

Although the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of
15
removal, and “[n]o procedure comparable to removal was
16
available at English common law,” the principle underlying
removal based on federal subject matter jurisdiction has been
17
prominent in the development of U.S. procedural law. Over two
centuries ago, in 1789, Congress enacted the first removal
18
procedures in the United States. Congress did not include the
foundation for removal based on federal subject matter jurisdiction
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of Removal, 77
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“The United States Constitution expressly authorizes
arising-under and diversity jurisdiction, without mentioning removal.”).
16. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731.
17. See Tristin K. Green, Complete Preemption—Removing the Mystery from
Removal, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 363, 364 (1998) (“[Removal] has been a part of
American jurisprudence for over 200 years.”). See generally Merrell Dow Pharm. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807–09 (1986) (discussing the history of the removal
process).
18. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73; see Bassett & Perschbacher,
supra note 15, at 2; Green, supra note 17, at 364–65.
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19

at that time. Instead, it took nearly one-hundred years until, in
1875, Congress extended removal to include claims arising under
20
federal subject matter jurisdiction. The only current significance
of the 1875 Act, granting either party the right to remove based on
federal subject matter, was that it was changed by the Removal Act
21
of 1887 only twelve years later.
The Removal Act of 1887 provided for an important change in
United States removal law when it expressly revised the provision of
the 1875 Act which granted either party the right to remove to
22
federal court based on federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Specifically, the Removal Act of 1887 expressly granted the
defendant the right to remove to federal courts based on federal
23
subject matter jurisdiction. This revision, which allowed for only
defendants to remove based on federal question, is the basis for the
24
current removal statute that is in place today.
B.

History of the Unanimity Requirement
25

In Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Martin, the
theory of the rule of unanimity was first brought to the Supreme
26
Court’s attention. Martin dealt with a wrongful death lawsuit
19. See § 12, 1 Stat. 73; Green, supra note 17, at 365 (“In that Act, however,
removal was limited to actions in diversity.”).
20. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (“[For] any suit
of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any State
court . . . and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . either
party may . . . remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for the
proper district.”).
21. See Adam R. Prescott, On Removal Jurisdiction’s Unanimous Consent
Requirement, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 241 (2011).
22. See Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553; Prescott, supra
note 21, at 241; Diversity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., http://
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_diversity.html (last visited Mar.
4, 2016).
23. See § 2, 24 Stat. at 553; Prescott, supra note 21, at 241.
24. See 28 U.S.C § 1441 (2012) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be
removed by the defendant or the defendants . . . .”) (emphasis added); Green, supra
note 17, at 365.
25. 178 U.S. 245, 246 (1900).
26. See Marie E. Chafe & Peter M. Durney, The Rules on Removal in MultipleParty Cases: A Reprise, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Aug. 16, 2012), http://
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/masstorts/articles/summer2012
-0812-rules-removal-multiple-party-cases-reprisal.html.
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against two railroad companies. One of the defendant railway
companies—Union Pacific Railway Company—sought to remove
28
the action from Kansas state court to federal court. The
remaining defendantChicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railroad
29
Companydid not join in the removal. This circumstance
presented the Court with a difficult question: “[W]hether it was
necessary for the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railroad
Company, defendant, to join in the application of its codefendants,
the receivers of the Union Pacific Railway Company, to effect a
30
removal to the circuit court.” Ultimately, the Court held that “a
removal could not be effected unless all the parties on the same
31
side of the controversy united in the petition.” This holding thus
brought about the notion that, in a case involving multiple
defendants, each defendant must join in the removal.
The principle of unanimity in removal motions existed as
merely case law until 2011, when President Obama signed into law
the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of
32
2011. One of the purposes of this Act was to “make several
changes to judicial procedures, including the determination of
33
original jurisdiction and court venue for certain types of cases.”
Importantly, this Act expressly codified the requirement of
34
unanimity among multiple defendants in a removal motion.
Section 1446 of the United States Code states: “When a civil action
is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have
been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal
35
of the action.”

27. See Martin, 178 U.S. at 246.
28. See id.
29. See id. The Supreme Court did not explain why Chicago, Rock Island, &
Pacific Railroad Company did not consent to removal. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 248.
32. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446); Jayne S.
Ressler, Removing Removal’s Unanimity Rule, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1391, 1392 (2013).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 4 (2011).
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
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History of the Unanimity Requirement of the Eighth Circuit and
Other Circuits Adopting the Sole Consent Rule

Much of the debate surrounding the rule of unanimity does
not deal directly with the notion of whether each defendant is
required to submit some form of consent to removal. Instead, the
major issue that courts have struggled with historically has been
when the thirty-day time frame that allows for consent is to
36
commence. Prior to the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act
37
of 2011, the codification of the removal statute was as follows:
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall
be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant,
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which
such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days
after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required
to be served on the defendant, whichever period is
shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,
a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of
a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other
paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case
is one which is or has become removable, except that a
case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction
conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year
38
after commencement of the action.
As the language of the former statute suggests, there is
ambiguity in determining how this statute would apply when there
39
are multiple defendants. Should the thirty-day countdown that
36. Ressler, supra note 32, at 1402 (“The unanimity rule complicated the
calculation of the thirty-day requirement when there were multiple defendants,
because there were no directives as to when the removal clock began . . . . The
absence of clear congressional guidelines created tremendous procedural
difficulty for the judiciary. Judges expressed concern that the rules ‘force them to
waste time determining jurisdictional issues at the expense of adjudicating
underlying litigation.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-10, at 4)).
37. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
39. See Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 15, at 8 (“The removal statutes are
silent as to how to reconcile the thirty-day time limit with differences in the timing
of service of multiple defendants.”).
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allows for a notice of removal start when the first defendant is
served with the complaint? Or should the countdown begin when
the final defendant is served with the complaint? Or should some
other interpretation prevail?
In order to help resolve this ambiguity, the courts developed
three different rules for interpreting how to comply with the
statute: (1) the first-served defendant rule, (2) the intermediate
40
rule, and (3) the last-served defendant rule. “The significance of
these rules stems from their connection to still another judicially
41
created rule—the rule of unanimity.”
a.

The First-Served Defendant Rule

Under the first-served defendant rule, the time frame for
allowing a defendant to file a motion to remove to federal court
begins the day that the first defendant is served and continues for
42
thirty days thereafter. Therefore, any subsequent defendant
served with a complaint after the first-served defendant has the
same amount of time remaining to file a motion to remove as the
first-served defendant, which would ultimately be less than thirty
43
days.
The theory of the first-served defendant rule has been met
44
with some criticism. Under the first-served defendant rule,
subsequent defendants may not have the opportunity to convince
the first-served defendant that removal is the proper course of
45
action. Additionally, plaintiffs may intentionally wait to serve the
40. See id.; Ressler, supra note 32, at 1402–03.
41. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 15, at 8 (citing Scott R. Haiber,
Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 648–49 (2004)).
42. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731; Ressler, supra note 32, at 1403.
43. Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The general
rule, however, is that ‘[i]f the first served defendant abstains from seeking removal
or does not effect a timely removal, subsequently served defendants cannot
remove . . . due to the rule of unanimity among defendants which is required for
removal.’” (quoting 1A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.168, at
586–87 (2d ed. 1985)); see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731 (“[A] failure of the
first defendant served in the state court action to file a notice of removal with the
district court within 30 days of service will prevent all subsequently served
defendants from removing the action.”).
44. See Paul E. Lund, The Timeliness of Removal and Multiple-Defendant Lawsuits,
64 BAYLOR L. REV. 50, 66 (2012) (citing Brown, 792 F.2d at 482).
45. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731 (“[W]hen some of the defendants are
served after the first-served defendant has failed to exercise its removal right
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subsequent defendants until the thirty-day window has passed, thus
46
depriving them of any chance at removal.
b.

The Intermediate Rule

The Fourth Circuit took a different approach to the timeliness
of removal in McKinney v. Board of Trustees of Mayland Community
47
College. In McKinney, the Fourth Circuit became the first court to
48
introduce the intermediate rule. The intermediate rule is similar
to the first-served defendant rule in the sense that at the time of the
first-served defendant’s service, the thirty-day time frame for
49
making a motion to remove commences. Thus, if the first-served
defendant does not file a motion to remove within thirty days of
service, subsequently served defendants may not remove the case to
50
federal court. The significance of the intermediate rule is that it
allows subsequently served defendants a full thirty days to consent to
the first-served defendant’s motion to remove, if the first-served
51
defendant makes such a motion.
within the statutory period, the subsequently served defendants are deprived of
the opportunity to persuade the first defendant to join the notice of removal.”).
46. See id. (explaining that a “plaintiff could choose to serve an
unsophisticated or poorly-advised defendant,” while intentionally refraining from
serving other defendants until the thirty days had passed); see also Ressler, supra
note 32, at 1405 (citing Lund, supra note 44, at 78 n.157, 79) (“Indeed, observers
lamented the opportunities available to plaintiffs to utilize the removal clock, in
conjunction with the requirements of the unanimity rule, to their advantage and
to strategically stagger service upon defendants in order to prevent otherwise
proper removal.”).
47. 955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992).
48. See id. at 926–28.
49. See Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 612 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
first-served defendant must file a notice of removal within thirty days of service;
later-served defendants have to join the notice within thirty days of service upon
them.”); see also Lund, supra note 44, at 76–77 (citing Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612)
(“Typically referred to as the intermediate rule, the Fourth Circuit’s approach
bears some resemblance to the first-served defendant rule, in that it requires that a
notice of removal be filed within thirty days of service on the first-served
defendant. If the first-served defendant does not file a notice, the case cannot be
removed.”).
50. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 15, at 16 (“Thus, under the so-called
intermediate rule, the time for removal expires thirty days after the first defendant
is served, without regard to when other defendants are served—the same result
required by the first-served defendant rule.”); Lund, supra note 44, at 77 (citing
Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612).
51. See Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612.

8. Meland_FF4 (1267-1295) (Do Not Delete)

2016]

6/27/2016 11:33 AM

GRIFFIOEN V. CEDAR RAPIDS & IOWA CITY RAILWAY CO. 1275

Similar to the first-served defendant rule, the intermediate
rule has been criticized as enabling plaintiffs to manipulate the
52
proceedings. For example, under the intermediate rule, a plaintiff
may still simply wait until the first-served defendant’s thirty-day
window has passed to serve a subsequent defendant, even if the
first-served defendant makes a motion to remove, thus depriving
the subsequent defendant of the opportunity to join in the
53
removal.
c.

The Last-Served Defendant Rule

Concern over plaintiffs’ unfair tactics in removal actions
54
brought about a new rule for dealing with multiple defendants. In
55
Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc., the Sixth Circuit became
56
the first court to apply the last-served defendant rule. Under the
last-served defendant rule, “each defendant [has] thirty days to file
a notice of removal from the date of its own personal service,
without regard to the date of service on earlier-served defendants
57
in the suit.” Thus, each defendant receives a new thirty days to
either consent to removal or make its own motion to remove to
58
federal court. Two years after the Brierly holding, the Eighth
52. Compare Ressler, supra note 32, at 1404 (“Both the first-served defendant
and the intermediate/McKinney rules were ripe for manipulation by plaintiffs.”),
with Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612 (“It is also worth noting that, under the McKinney
Intermediate Rule, the later-served defendants are in no worse position than they
would have been if the parties in the case were not completely diverse or the firstserved defendant (or any other defendant) had opposed removal.”).
53. See Ressler, supra note 32, at 1404 (explaining that a plaintiff could wait
until the thirty-day window had passed “and then serve additional defendants”).
54. See Lund, supra note 44, at 69; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731
(“Because the first-served defendant rule deprives subsequently served defendants
of the opportunity to remove, the Sixth Circuit held in Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible
Packaging, Inc. that the last-served defendant should be allowed a full 30 days to
remove after being served.”).
55. 184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999).
56. See id. at 533 (“[W]e hold that a later-served defendant has 30 days from
the date of service to remove a case to federal district court, with the consent of
the remaining defendants.”); Lund, supra note 44, at 70.
57. Ressler, supra note 32, at 1404–05 (citing Bailey v. Janssen
Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2008)). Ressler further
explains that courts adopted the rule because it was “more consistent with the
statutory removal language.” Id. at 1405.
58. See Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533 (holding that a subsequently served defendant
“has 30 days from the date of service to remove a case to federal district court, with
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Circuit adopted this last-served defendant rule in Marano Enterprises
59
of Kansas v. Z-Teca Restaurants, L.P. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit
held that “the later-served defendants in this case had thirty days
from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the
unanimous consent of their co-defendants, even though the firstserved co-defendants did not file a notice of removal within thirty
60
days of service on them.” In recent years, courts have shifted
61
toward the adoption of the last-served defendant rule. The recent
enactment of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
62
Clarification Act of 2011 expressly codified this rule.
C.

History of the Circuit Courts as It Relates to Giving Consent to
Removal

Importantly, this note now turns to the history of the consent
63
requirement needed to satisfy the rule of unanimity prior to the
enactment of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011, which was the Act on which the Griffioen
64
court partially based its holding. In other words, this section
details the form of consent needed to properly join a removal.
the consent of the remaining defendants”).
59. 254 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We conclude that, if faced with the
issue before us today, the Court would allow each defendant thirty days after
receiving service within which to file a notice of removal, regardless of when—or
if—previously served defendants had filed such notices.”); Lund, supra note 44, at
70.
60. Marano, 254 F.3d at 757.
61. Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The trend in
recent case law favors the later-served defendant rule.”); Ressler, supra note 32, at
1404 (“Recently, courts moved toward adoption of the ‘last-served defendant’
rule.”).
62. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758, 760 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2));
see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 14 (2011) (“New subparagraph 1446(b)(2)(B)
provides that each defendant will have 30 days from his or her own date of service
(or receipt of initial pleading) to seek removal.”); Elizabeth L. Alvine, Note,
Jurisdictional Remix: The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Presents
New Challenges to Federal Litigation, 89 N.D. L. REV. 163, 171 (2013).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012). The rule of unanimity requires all
defendants to join in or consent to removal from a state court on any civil action.
64. Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187 (8th
Cir. 2015) (“So also here, we are once again disinclined to adopt a hard-line
requirement, particularly in light of the new language of § 1446. The 2011
amendments to § 1446 that codified the rule of unanimity did not describe the
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Historically, circuit courts have been at odds with each other in
determining whether the consent requirement of the rule of
65
unanimity has been met. Courts have wrestled with whether a sole
defendant may consent for his codefendants, or whether each
defendant needs to individually give some form of written
66
consent.
1.

A Sole Defendant Can “Vouch” for the Consent of Its
Codefendants in a Motion to Remove to Federal Court

Prior to the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011, several circuit courts held that a sole
defendant may give consent for its codefendants in a motion to
67
remove to federal court. This theory is sometimes called the
68
“vouching rule.” The majority of these decisions looked at the
69
statutory language; specifically, the courts pointed out that 28
U.S.C. § 1446, the removal statute, required consent of the parties
to be signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
70
Procedure. Accordingly, these courts subsequently explained that
under Rule 11, only one attorney of record needs to certify that the

form of or time frame for consent when multiple defendants are involved.”).
65. See Kathryn A. Kotlik, Note, Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.: The
Ninth Circuit Failed to Follow the Rule of Unanimity When Applying Rule 11 to a Case with
Multiple Defendants, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 261, 261 (2010) (“Although the rule of
unanimity is well-settled, federal courts have disagreed over the ways defendants
may satisfy the rule.”); Prescott, supra note 21, at 247 (“Although there is no
reason to doubt the future of the unanimity rule itself, federal courts are divided
regarding the functional application of the rule in multi-defendant lawsuits.”).
66. See Prescott, supra note 21, at 247 (“Some federal courts require each
defendant to submit his own consent form, whereas other federal courts allow one
defendant to pledge in the notice of removal that all the other defendants have
consented.”).
67. See, e.g., Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e interpret that requirement [of unanimity] as met if, as here,
one defendant avers that all defendants consent to removal.”); Harper v.
AutoAlliance Int’l Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 201–02 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Prescott,
supra note 21, at 247–50 (discussing the Proctor and Vishay holdings).
68. See, e.g., Prescott, supra note 21, at 247.
69. See, e.g., Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225.
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2012) (“A defendant or defendants desiring to
remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the
United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a
notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure . . . .”).
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71

contentions have factual support. Thus, the courts concluded that
72
a single attorney may give consent for a party’s codefendants. This
was the conclusion reached in Harper v. AutoAlliance International,
73
Inc.
In Harper, the plaintiff brought suit against three different
defendants alleging retaliatory discharge after he filed with the
74
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Asserting that the
allegations were based on federal subject matter jurisdiction,
AutoAlliance and Childress, two of the three defendants, jointly
75
filed a notice of removal to the federal courts. Kelly, the third
defendant, did not sign the notice of removal submitted by his
76
77
codefendants. However, similar to the defendants in Griffioen,
AutoAlliance and Childress’ notice of removal stated, “Counsel for
AutoAlliance, AAI and Childress has obtained concurrence from
counsel for the UAW, who represents defendant Jeffrey Kelly, in
78
removing this matter.” Reasoning that Rule 11 requires only one
79
attorney of record to certify the contentions have factual support,
the Harper court held that “[n]othing in Rule 11 . . . required Kelly
or his attorney to submit a pleading, written motion, or other paper
directly expressing that concurrence or prohibited counsel for the
71. See Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225; Harper, 392 F.3d at 201 (pointing out that
under Rule 11, any pleading needs to be signed “by at least one attorney of
record” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a))).
72. See Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225 (“Applying these general principles, we
conclude that the filing of a notice of removal can be effective without individual
consent documents on behalf of each defendant.”); Harper, 392 F.3d at 201–02
(noting that in the event a notice of removal misrepresented a defendant’s assent
to the removal, “no doubt [that defendant] would have brought this
misrepresentation to the court’s attention and [the court could] . . . have
impose[d] appropriate sanctions”).
73. See Harper, 392 F.3d at 201.
74. See id. at 198 (“On June 28, 2002, Harper, an African-American, filed a
complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court against Defendants AutoAlliance, AAI,
Kelly, and Allen Childress, a supervisor at AutoAlliance’s facility in Flat Rock,
Michigan. Harper alleged that Childress gave preferential treatment to nonminority staff, and . . . Harper filed a grievance and then a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission . . . .”).
75. See id. at 199.
76. Id.
77. See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185
(8th Cir. 2015) (explaining that one defendant’s notice for removal expressly
stated that its codefendants had given consent to the removal).
78. Harper, 392 F.3d at 199.
79. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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other defendants from making such a representation on Kelly’s
80
behalf.” The court subtly added another minor policy reason for
allowing a sole defendant to consent for its codefendants.
Specifically, the court pointed out that the defendant who did not
expressly join in consenting to the removal would have brought the
courts attention to the issue if the defendant wished for the case to
remain in state court or if the codefendant claiming all parties
81
consented did so through misrepresentation.
2.

A Single Defendant Cannot Give Consent for Its Codefendants in
a Motion to Remove to Federal Court

Prior to the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue
Clarification Act of 2011, in opposition to allowing a single
defendant to consent for its codefendants, some courts required
that each defendant individually express his or her consent for
82
removal. By requiring all defendants to individually express their
consent, some courts have coined this requirement as the
83
“independent-and-unambiguous consent requirement.” Courts
that have applied the independent-and-unambiguous consent
84
requirement have a different interpretation of Rule 11. Courts
applying this rule believe that each defendant’s attorney must file
85
an independent consent.
80. Harper, 392 F.3d at 201–02.
81. See id. at 202 (“Had counsel for AutoAlliance, AAI and Childress
misrepresented Kelly’s concurrence in the removal, no doubt Kelly would have
brought this misrepresentation to the court’s attention and it would have been
within the district court’s power to impose appropriate sanctions, including a
remand to state court.”).
82. Kotlik, supra note 65, at 261–62; see Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d
1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that there must “be some timely filed written
indication from each served defendant” (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1261 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988))); Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298,
301 (7th Cir. 1994) (“To ‘join’ a motion is to support it in writing, which the other
defendants here did not.”), abrogated by Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
83. Prescott, supra note 21, at 252.
84. Compare Harper, 392 F.3d at 201 (pointing out that, under rule 11, any
pleading needs to be signed “by at least one attorney of record”), with Creekmore
v. Food Lion, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“Rule 11 does not
authorize one party to make representations or file pleadings on behalf of
another.”).
85. See Creekmore, 797 F. Supp. at 508 (“Both Stanley Works and Carolina
Door are represented by counsel and clearly are ‘movants’ subject to the
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Advocates of the independent-and-unambiguous consent
requirement argue that requiring individual consent from each
defendant serves the interests of both the plaintiffs and the
86
defendants. Specifically, a plaintiff stands to gain from requiring
each defendant to individually consent to removal because under
the voucher rule, a plaintiff’s original decision to file in state court
could be disrupted by a single defendant erroneously vouching for
87
consent of its codefendants. The independent-and-unambiguous
88
rule also benefits the defendants. For example, a defendant could
intentionally misrepresent that its codefendants consent to
removal, without providing the codefendants notice that it has
89
done so. In such a situation, the non-consenting defendants “are
now stuck in federal court unless and until they move to have the
case remanded—assuming there is no jurisdictional flaw that
90
prompts the court to remand the case sua sponte.”

requirements of Rule 11. They must file their own signed pleadings.”).
86. See Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“The requirement of unanimity serves the interests of plaintiffs, defendants and
the judiciary.”); Sansone v. Morton Mach. Works, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184
(D.R.I. 2002) (“One of the purposes of this ‘rule of unanimity’ is to prevent the
defendants from gaining an unfair tactical advantage by splitting the litigation and
requiring the plaintiff to pursue the case in two fora simultaneously . . . .”); Martin
Oil Co. v. Phila. Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 1236, 1238 (N.D. W. Va. 1993)
(explaining that “requiring each defendant to either sign the notice of removal,
file its own notice of removal, or file a written consent or written joinder to the
original notice of removal” ensures that unanimity has been achieved).
87. Prescott, supra note 21, at 269–70 (“It also better protects the plaintiff’s
forum choice: when there is doubt in the removal procedure, which occurs when
one defendant vouches for the other’s consent rather than each defendant
individually expressing consent, an approach that creates exceptions for
defendants and lowers the requirements for removal facilitates a defendant’s
ability to disrupt the plaintiff’s original decision to litigate in state court.”).
88. See Esposito, 590 F.3d at 75; Prescott, supra note 21, at 274 (“[T]he
independent consent requirement ensures that all nonmoving defendants are
afforded proper notice before being haled into federal court, as due process
requires. If every federal court adopts the independent-and-unambiguous consent
requirement, all parties to a lawsuit—both plaintiffs and defendants—will
immediately benefit from the efficiency and simplicity of the rule.”).
89. See Prescott, supra note 21, at 264 (“[T]he court assumes that given the
moving defendant’s vouching of consent and the nonmoving defendant’s lack of
resistance, the nonmoving defendant is aware that he is an official party to a
lawsuit in federal court. The nonmoving defendant, however, is not guaranteed
such notice.”).
90. Id. at 265.
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Prior to the codification of the rule of unanimity—and prior to
the Griffioen holding—the Eighth Circuit believed the independentand-unambiguous consent rule was the proper way to analyze
91
§ 1446. Specifically, in Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., Pritchett and other
plaintiffs filed a products liability action against Cottrell and other
92
defendants. After the complaint had been filed, Cottrell filed a
motion to move to federal court, to which all but one defendant
93
had expressly consented. Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to
remand the action to state court, arguing that unanimous consent
94
had been improper. The court was thus tasked with determining
95
whether consent to the removal had been met.
In its holding, the court points out that each defendant does
96
not need to ultimately sign the notice of removal, which the court
97
in Griffioen also alludes to in its holding. However, in Pritchett, the
Eighth Circuit expressly stated, “[t]here must, however, ‘be some
timely filed written indication from each served defendant,’ or
from some person with authority to act on the defendant’s behalf,
indicating that the defendant ‘has actually consented’ to the
98
removal.” Thus, prior to the enactment of the Federal Courts
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, the Eighth Circuit
99
advocated for the independent-and-unambiguous consent rule.
The splitting approaches to the consent requirement of the rule of
100
unanimity were the focal point of Griffioen.
91. See Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008); see also
Kotlik, supra note 65, at 271 (explaining that the Eighth Circuit required “each
defendant [to] submit written indication of its consent to the removal”).
92. 512 F.3d at 1058–59. Pritchett, Scott, and Fix filed a claim alleging that
they had sustained injuries due to a faulty ratchet system designed by one of the
defendants, Cottrell. Id.
93. Id. at 1061 (“Cottrell filed a Notice of Removal of Civil Action in federal
court with the consent of every defendant except JCT. The written consents were
attached to the Notice of Removal as an exhibit.”).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1062.
96. Id. (“While the failure of one defendant to consent renders the removal
defective, each defendant need not necessarily sign the notice of removal.”).
97. See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187
(8th Cir. 2015).
98. Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am.,
841 F.2d 1254, 1261 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988)).
99. See id. at 1062; Kotlik, supra note 65, at 271.
100. See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1186–87 (explaining that neither the Supreme
Court nor Congress have directly addressed what form consent must take, and
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III. CASE DESCRIPTIONS
A.

Facts, Procedure, and Holding of the Splitting Seventh Circuit
101

In Roe v. O’Donohue, the Seventh Circuit took a different
approach than the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Griffioen concerning
the consent requirement of the rule of unanimity. In Roe, the
102
plaintiff (Roe) underwent a medical procedure in 1984. During
his procedure, Roe was given a transfusion of cryoprecipitate AHF,
103
which is a type of blood product. Following the procedure, Roe
104
was diagnosed with the HIV disease. It was Roe’s belief that he
105
contracted HIV as a result of receiving the cryoprecipitate. Roe
brought suit against three different defendants: (1) the American
Red Cross; (2) the doctor who recommended the surgery,
including the hospital where it was performed; and (3) the doctors
106
who actually performed the surgery. Roe initially filed his lawsuit
107
in state court. Similar to Union Pacific in Griffioen, the Red Cross
defendants “removed the case to federal court, representing that
the other defendants ‘do not object to the removal of this action to
108
federal court.’” Thus, the facts are similar to those of Griffioen in
the sense that one defendant sought to satisfy the rule of unanimity
109
by stating the codefendants do not object to the removal.
The Seventh Circuit pointed to the Red Cross defendant’s
statement that “[a]ll other defendants who have been served with

therefore the circuit courts are split).
101. 38 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999).
102. Id. at 300.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The Red Cross was responsible for collecting and distributing the
cryoprecipitate. Id. Roe alleged that the Red Cross was “negligent in collecting and
distributing blood containing the virus.” Id. He alleged that the recommending
doctor and hospital were “negligent in recommending the operation and failing
to warn about the risks of using cryoprecipitate.” Id. He also alleged that the
doctors performed the surgery negligently. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Red Cross’ basis for removal was 36 U.S.C. § 300105(a)(5)
(2012), which states that the Red Cross may “sue and be sued in courts of law and
equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id.
109. See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185
(8th Cir. 2015); Roe, 38 F.3d at 300.
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summons in this action have stated that they do not object to the
removal of this action to federal court,” and held that “[u]nder
110
ordinary standards, this is deficient.” The court went on to say,
“To ‘join’ a motion is to support it in writing, which the other
111
defendants here did not.”
Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
differs from the Eight Circuit when dealing with the consent
112
requirement of the rule of unanimity.
B.

Facts, Procedure, and Holding of Griffioen

Mark Griffioen, Mike and Joyce Ludvicek, Sandra Skelton, and
Brian Vanous (Griffioen Group) were injured when the Cedar
113
River flooded in 2008. The Griffioen Group owned various plots
114
of land throughout Cedar Rapids, Iowa. At varying points of the
river, the defendants, (collectively, the Rail Group) owned and
maintained various railway bridges that spanned the width of the
115
river. In June 2008, the Cedar River crested at its highest point in
116
recorded history. To combat the potential flooding, the Rail
Group placed railcars filled with rocks or other heaving materials
117
along some of the bridges that spanned the river. The Griffioen
Group alleged that because of the Rail Group’s actions—weighing
118
down the railroad cars—the bridge became unstable. Sometime
in late June, some of the Rail Group owned railway bridges along
119
the Cedar River collapsed, which caused the river to dam.
Because of the bridges’ collapse, the Griffioen Group maintains

110. Roe, 38 F.3d at 301.
111. Id.
112. Compare Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185 (granting the notion that a single
defendant can satisfy the rule of unanimity requirement mandating all defendants
to consent to removal), with Roe, 38 F.3d at 300 (denying the notion that a single
defendant can give consent for its codefendants, absent express written consent
from the codefendants).
113. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185.
114. Appellant Brief at 5, Griffioen, 785 F.3d 1182 (No. 13-3170), 2013 WL
6729371, at *5.
115. See id.; Brief of Defendants-Appellees Union Pacific Railroad Co. &
Union Pacific Corp. at 2, Griffioen, 785 F.3d 1182 (No. 13-3170), 2014 WL 586958,
at *2.
116. See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellees Union Pacific Railroad Co. &
Union Pacific Corp., supra note 115, at 2.
117. See id.
118. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185.
119. Id.
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that the water from the Cedar River was diverted onto their land,
120
thus causing them damage.
The Griffioen Group brought suit in Iowa state court against
Union Pacific Railway Company and Union Pacific Corporation
(collectively, Union Pacific), Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway,
and Alliant Energy Corporation (collectively, CRANDIC), and ten
121
additional defendants (collectively, the Stickle Defendants). On
June 7, 2013, the Griffioen Group served the CRANDIC defendants
122
with their complaint. The following day, the Stickle Defendants
123
were served with the complaint. Two days later, on June 10, 2013,
124
Union Pacific was served with the complaint. In their complaint,
the Griffioen Group claimed that the Rail Group neglected to
adequately build and maintain railroad bridges over the Cedar
125
River.
Union Pacific filed a notice of removal based on federal
126
question jurisdiction on July 2, 2013. In its notice, Union Pacific
stated, “Undersigned counsel . . . have contacted attorneys for the
other named co-defendants in this matter, and there is no
127
objection to removal.” Along with this notice was a signed local
rule certification stating, “The co-defendants have given their
128
consent to the removal of this action.” Union Pacific’s notice of
129
removal was within the thirty-day time frame of § 1446. On July
10, 2013, the thirtieth day for filing a notice of removal, CRANDIC
130
filed a written consent to the removal. On July 31, 2013, which is
outside of the thirty-day window allowing a party to consent to
131
132
removal, the Stickle Defendants filed consent to the removal.
120. See id.
121. Id. Union Pacific filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which
the district court granted. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. Specifically, the alleged claims were based on the theories of
negligence, strict liability for dangerous or ultra-hazardous activity, and strict
liability based on Iowa Code sections 468.148 and 327F.2. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2012).
130. Brief of Defendants-Appellees Union Pacific Railroad Co. & Union
Pacific Corp., supra note 115, at 2.
131. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
132. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185. The Griffioen Group had already filed a
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The question before the court was whether, based on the
consent of a single defendant that stated all codefendants consent
133
to the removal, the rule of unanimity had been satisfied. The
court correctly pointed out that “removal based on a federal
134
question requires the unanimous consent of all defendants.”
However, this was the first time that the Eighth Circuit had been
presented with “the question [of] whether a representation in a
removing defendant’s notice stating that its codefendants consent
135
can satisfy § 1446’s unanimity requirement.”
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a single
defendant can satisfy the unanimous consent requirement of
136
§ 1446. The court pointed out that its own holding in Pritchett v.
137
Cottrell “left open the possibility that the unanimity requirement
could be met when the removing defendant gives notice of its
138
codefendants’ consent.” The Eighth Circuit pointed to the new
language of § 1146—the rule of unanimity statute—which does not
prescribe the particular form or time frame for cases involving
139
multiple defendants. Thus, the court concluded that without a
bright-line form of consent codified in statute, the court was
140
unwilling to adopt a rule that “places form over substance.”

motion to remand, arguing that because not all of the defendants had consented
within the thirty-day time frame, removal was improper.
133. See id. at 1186–87.
134. Id. at 1186; see also Ressler, supra note 32, at 1396 (“[A]ll defendants in a
removable action must agree to removal or the case remains in state court.”).
135. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187.
136. See id. at 1188 (“We therefore hold that a defendant’s timely removal
notice indicating consent on behalf of a codefendant, signed and certified
pursuant to Rule 11 and followed by the filing of a notice of consent from the
codefendant itself, sufficiently establishes that codefendant’s consent to
removal.”).
137. 512 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008).
138. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187; see also Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1062 (“While the
failure of one defendant to consent renders the removal defective, each defendant
need not necessarily sign the notice of removal.”). But see Christiansen v. W.
Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We also emphasize
that non-removing defendants who wish to evince consent to removal should
either sign the notice of removal or file a timely and unequivocal consent to such
course of conduct.”).
139. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2012); Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187 (“Congress could
have defined with equal specificity the form of or time for consent but chose not
to do so.”).
140. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187.
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Importantly, the Eighth Circuit court also pointed to policy
considerations that supported the notion of a single defendant
141
consenting for its codefendants. In particular, the court reasoned
that when a defendant gives consent for its codefendants in a
removal action, accompanied by a local rule certification, the
142
moving defendant subjects himself to Rule 11 sanctions. This
subjection to sanctions provides opportunities for codefendants “to
alert the court to any falsities in the removing defendant’s notice
serve as safeguards to prevent removing defendants from making
false representations of unanimous consent and forcing
143
codefendants into a federal forum against their will.”
IV. ANALYSIS
The court in Griffioen correctly decided the question of
whether, under § 1446, a single defendant can give consent for all
144
defendants in a multi-defendant action. However, the court in
Griffioen neglected to delve deep enough into the underlying
reasons for allowing a sole defendant to give consent. Using
statutory interpretation to a greater extent than the court in
Griffioen, § 1446 does not require all defendants to individually
145
express their consent to removal. Perhaps most importantly, this
analysis will address the ethical considerations that an attorney is
subjected to under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that
146
the court could have used to further support its holding.
A.

Statutory Interpretation

Prior to the enactment of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and
Venue Clarification Act of 2011, § 1446 did not codify the rule of
147
unanimity set forth in Chicago Rock Island. Instead, the language
141. See id. (“Furthermore, we believe that policy considerations support the
validity of the consent in the circumstances of this case.”).
142. Id. at 1187–88; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
143. Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187.
144. See id. at 1188 (“We therefore hold that a defendant’s timely removal
notice indicating consent on behalf of a codefendant, signed and certified
pursuant to Rule 11 and followed by the filing of a notice of consent from the
codefendant itself, sufficiently establishes that codefendant’s consent to
removal.”).
145. See infra Section IV.A.
146. See infra Section IV.B.
147. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 13 (2011) (“New subparagraph (b)(2)(A)
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of the former § 1446 simply stated that ”[a] defendant or
defendants desiring to remove any civil action” must file a “notice
of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
148
Procedure.” Thus, there was no statutory language that addressed
149
the requirement that all defendants must consent to removal.
Conversely, the current statute expressly codifies the rule of
150
unanimity, as the court correctly points out. By applying statutory
interpretation to the new § 1446, it is clear that the Eighth Circuit
court in Griffioen decided correctly.
In general, “[s]tatutory interpretation is the process of
151
determining the meaning of a legislative act called a statute.” To
help interpret a statute, courts have developed numerous “canons
152
of construction” to resolve ambiguities. “An advantage of the
canons of construction is that they provide some convenient and
153
fairly uniform approaches for interpreting words.”
As a general starting point of statutory interpretation, courts
154
look at the plain meaning of the words in a statute. The plain
codifies the well-established ‘rule of unanimity’ for cases involving multiple
defendants. Under that rule, which is generally traced to the Supreme Court
decision in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 251
(1900), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or
consent to removal.”); Kotlik, supra note 65, at 261 (“The rule of unanimity is a
common-law rule that requires all defendants join in the removal of the action.”
(emphasis added)).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006).
149. See id.; supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text.
150. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012); Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa
City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187 (8th Cir. 2015).
151. LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 4 (2d ed. 2013);
see also RONALD B. BROWN & SHARON J. BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE
SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 4 (2d ed. 2011) (“Interpreting the statute is the
process of figuring out what the statute means.”).
152. See Vaidyanathan v. Seagate U.S. LLC, 691 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2012)
(“But if the statute is ambiguous—that is, if it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation—we apply canons of construction to discern the
legislature’s intent.” (citing Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn.
2010))); David Kurzweil, Criminal and Civil Rico: Traditional Canons of Statutory
Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41,
47–48 (1996) (“[V]arious canons of construction have evolved that help judges to
resolve ambiguities in the countless statutes that are plagued by poor
draftsmanship and oversight or that intentionally avoid thorny issues.”).
153. K.K. DuVivier, The Volley of Canons, 26 COLO. LAW. 59, 59 (1997).
154. See Reves v. Ersnt & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (“In determining
the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is
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meaning canon of construction is a judge-made theory of
interpreting a statute that asks the court to “ignore legislative
155
history if the meaning of a statute is plain on its face.” In other
words, the court determines if the statute can be read
156
unambiguously by looking at the actual language of the statute.
Dictionaries are a common tool for aiding in the determination of
157
the plain meaning of a word in a statute. Applying this tool to the
158
the court could have looked at the plain
case in Griffioen,
159
meaning of the word “join” found in § 1446. “Join” is defined as
160
“put[ting] or bring[ing] together so as to form a unit.” Albeit a
weaker argument, an argument could nonetheless be made that, by
Union Pacific vouching for the Stickle defendants’ consent, Union
Pacific effectively “put” the Stickle defendants in the consenting
unit. However, it is unlikely that the court would have decided this
way, as “join” may still be seen as ambiguous.
As an alternative to using the plain meaning canon of
construction or other canons to determine the legislature’s intent
in enacting a particular statute, the purpose approach is a common
161
tool. Under the purpose approach, the court first looks at the
162
type of problem that the enacted legislation sought to remedy.
Once the problem has been identified, the next step is to

unambiguous, in the absence of ‘a clearly expressed legislative intent to the
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” (quoting
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981))).
155. Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 433 (1994).
156. CBS Inc. v. Prime Time 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir.
2001).
157. See JELLUM, supra note 151, at 82 (“Most commonly today judges turn to
their own understanding of a word’s meaning or to dictionaries.”); see also
Ziperstein v. Tax Comm’r, 423 A.2d 129, 133 (Conn. 1979) (“Where a statute or
regulation does not define a term, it is appropriate to focus upon its common
understanding as expressed in the law and upon its dictionary meaning.” (citing
Hearst Corp. v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 308 A.2d 679 (Md. 1973))).
158. Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir.
2015).
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“When a civil action is removed solely
under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served
must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” (emphasis added)).
160. Join, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004).
161. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 151, at 47 (“The purpose approach is
currently one of the most popular approaches to statutory interpretation.”).
162. See id. at 47–48.
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determine which interpretation best accomplishes the legislature’s
163
goals. Applied to the Griffioen case, the problem that the Federal
Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 remedied
in § 1446 was the codification of the long-standing common law
164
rule of unanimity. Accordingly, the courts should interpret the
language of § 1446’s consent requirement as broadly as possible
because a narrow reading of this requirement would restrict the
end result of unanimity, which is what the Federal Courts
165
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 sought to avoid.
Therefore, under the purpose approach, the consent requirement
should be read to allow a single defendant to vouch for another
defendant’s consent in order to satisfy the rule of unanimity.
Another approach worth noting is a textualism approach.
“Textualism is the treatment of the statutory text as the primary
source of determining what the legislature intended. . . . Textualists
point out that the legislature voted only on the statutory language;
166
nothing else was enacted.”
Indeed, textualism is a form of
167
interpretation that parallels very closely the plain meaning rule.
Under a textualism approach, the court looks at the words of a
statute, and “makes no attempt to discern any underlying intent of
168
the adopting legislature.”
Accordingly, under a textualism
approach, the court that is trying to ascertain the legislative intent
concerning the consent requirement of § 1446 cannot place a limit
on what is considered proper form for giving consent because the
text of § 1446 makes no mention about the proper way to give
169
consent. The court in Griffioen correctly points out that the
legislature had the ability to prescribe the form for giving consent,

163. See id. at 48.
164. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 13 (2011) (“New subparagraph (b)(2)(A)
codifies the well-established ‘rule of unanimity’ for cases involving multiple
defendants.”).
165. See id.
166. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 151, at 52–53 (emphasis added).
167. JELLUM, supra note 151, at 27 (“Textualism is sometimes called the plain
meaning theory of interpretation because textualism is based on the plain meaning
canon of interpretation.”).
168. FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
25 (2009); see also JELLUM, supra note 151, at 27 (“Only the text goes through this
process; thus, textualists believe that looking beyond the enacted text raises
constitutional concerns.”).
169. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012).
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but declined to do so. The textualism approach is thus consistent
with the holding in Griffioen.
B.

Implications of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct

The court in Griffioen points out that the possibility of Rule 11
sanctions against the attorney who is asserting that all defendants
consent to removal is a policy consideration in favor of allowing a
171
sole defendant to consent for its codefendants. As previously
discussed, this policy implication is widely used among courts that
172
allow a sole defendant to give consent for all. However, the court
in Griffioen should have also examined the policy implications
brought upon the attorney who gives consent as it relates to the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
The American Bar Association is tasked with writing and
173
editing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct serve as an ethical guide to
174
attorneys. Accordingly, an attorney who violates one of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct is subjecting himself or herself to
175
disciplinary action. In the application of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to the scenario in Griffioen, two rules are
implicated.
Rule 3.1 requires an attorney to “not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
176
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous . . . .” In other
words, an attorney is not allowed to file a motion that is frivolous or
170. Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185–87
(8th Cir. 2015) (“Congress could have defined with equal specificity the form of or
time for consent but chose not to do so.”).
171. See id. at 1187–88 (explaining that Rule 11 prevents defendants from
making misrepresentations concerning unanimous consent).
172. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
173. See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 14 (2d ed. 2008).
174. See Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 275 (N.J. 1998) (“By this language, the
ABA ‘intended to make clear that the purpose of the Model Rules was to regulate
lawyer conduct through the disciplinary process, not to serve as a basis for civil
liability.’”).
175. See id.; LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 21 (“[T]he highest court in
each state is ultimately responsible for enforcing its rules by disciplining lawyers
who violate them.”).
176. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis
added).
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obviously false. In a way, Rule 3.1 mimics Rule 11 in the sense
178
that an attorney is not allowed to bring a claim that is frivolous.
However, a violation of Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional
179
Conduct has different disciplinary consequences. Specifically,
violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct results in a bar
disciplinary action, where violating Rule 11 can result in sanctions
180
set forth by a judge. Applied to the Griffioen case, there is a policy
consideration that the lawyer who asserts that all defendants
consent to the action is subjecting him or herself to disciplinary
action by the state bar association. Similar to the policy
181
consideration of Rule 11 to which the Eighth Circuit alludes, the
threat of state bar disciplinary action for violating Rule 3.1 of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct serves as a “safeguard[] to
prevent removing defendants from making false representations of
unanimous consent and forcing codefendants into a federal forum
182
against their will.”
The second rule that is applicable to the Griffioen case is Rule
183
Rule 3.3
3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
mandates that a lawyer shall not “knowingly make a false statement of
fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
184
lawyer.” In other words, Rule 3.3 disallows a lawyer from making a
185
false statement to the court. The rule requires the lawyer to make
177. See James W. MacFarlane, Frivolous Conduct Under Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.1, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 231, 231 (1996); Richard P. Mauro, The Chilling Effect
that the Threat of Sanctions Can Have on Effective Representation in Capital Cases, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 427–28 (2007) (explaining that “[a] ‘frivolous’ claim is
generally thought to be one which is ‘obviously false on the face of the pleading.’”
(quoting Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2003))).
178. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1, with FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
179. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 602.
180. See id. (“Violation of Rule 3.1 can result in bar disciplinary action against
an attorney. A violation of FRCP 11 is punished not by the state bar but by the
judge in the civil action, and it can result in nonmonetary directives or monetary
sanctions against a lawyer or a party.”).
181. See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187
(8th Cir. 2015).
182. Id.
183. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3.
184. Id. (emphasis added).
185. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 606 (“Rule 3.3(a)(1) bars false
statements to courts by lawyers themselves, as opposed to false testimony by clients
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assertions that he or she knows to be true, or believes to be true
186
based on a “diligent inquiry.”
Similar to the application of Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3, if violated, subjects the attorney to
187
discipline by the state bar association. Therefore, allowing an
attorney to sign an affidavit which purports to give consent for all
codefendants should be allowed under § 1446 because of the threat
188
of discipline from the state bar association under Rule 3.3.
Similar to the threat of Rule 11 sanctions under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, an attorney is certifying that the allegations set
forth in a motion are true and should therefore suffice as consent
of all the parties.
C.

The Possibility for Misuse

Although the Eighth Circuit was correct in its application of
§ 1446, the doors for misuse have nonetheless been opened as a
189
result of this holding. Under the vouching rule, which the Eighth
190
Circuit effectively adopted with its holding, the potential for
forcing a codefendant into federal court is heightened because a
sole defendant could intentionally misrepresent to the court that
all defendants consented to removal, thereby forcing a
191
codefendant into federal court. This is one of the particular
192
problems that the rule of unanimity seeks to redress. It is true

or other witnesses.”).
186. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3 cmt. 3 (“However, an assertion
purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or
in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows
the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent
inquiry.”).
187. See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 602.
188. See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text.
189. Creekmore v. Food Lion, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(“To allow one party, through counsel, to bind or represent the position of other
parties without their express consent to be so bound would have serious adverse
repercussions, not only in removal situations but in any incident of litigation.”).
190. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
191. Prescott, supra note 21, at 265.
192. See Sansone v. Morton Mach. Works, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184
(D.R.I. 2002) (“Other purposes are to eliminate the risk of inconsistent state and
federal adjudications, and to prevent one defendant from imposing his choice of
forum upon other unwilling defendants and an unwilling plaintiff.”); Spillers v.
Tillman, 959 F. Supp. 364, 369 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (explaining that the
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that in a situation where an unwilling defendant is forced into
federal court because of misrepresentation, the unwilling
193
defendant can seek to have the case remanded to state court.
However, remanding a case to state court can involve problems
194
both with the federal court and the state court. Moreover, the
unwilling defendant may decide not to file a motion to remand to
195
state court. This decision could be based on a number of factors,
including the probability of success, time constraints, cost of court
filings, attorney’s fees, or the result of the significant delay
196
associated with remanding an action to state court. Contrary to
the vouching rule, the independent-and-unambiguous rule allows a
defendant to easily point out that removal to federal court is not
appropriate because the non-consenting defendant did not file his
197
or her individual consent to removal.
V. CONCLUSION
In Griffioen, the court was presented with a difficult question:
whether a sole defendant, who files a motion to remove to federal
court, may give consent for its codefendants when that sole
defendant signs a local rule certification that subjects the sole
198
defendant to Rule 11 sanctions. Since the common law rule of
unanimity was first formed in the United States in 1900, the circuit
courts have been at odds with each other regarding the proper

“[a]pplication of the unanimity rule to federal question cases . . . prevents one
defendant from imposing his choice of forum upon other unwilling defendants
. . . .”); Prescott, supra note 21, at 265.
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2012); Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l Inc., 392
F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the non-consenting defendant
could remand the case to state court if the defendant did not, in fact, consent to
removal in the first place).
194. See Rebecca Martin, New Problems with Removal and the ALI, 54 U. KAN. L.
REV. 489, 502–05 (2006) (“[I]nitially federal district courts began to assert in dicta
and holdings the power to remand entire federal question cases that had been
removed from state courts. Later, numerous circuit courts wrote opinions that
asserted that they in fact did not have the discretion to remand whole cases that
included federal questions to state court. Instead, these courts argued that the
discretion to remand cases to state court was limited.”).
195. See Prescott, supra note 21, at 265.
196. Id.
197. See id. at 252.
198. See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185–87
(8th Cir. 2015).
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199

form for consenting to removal to federal court. The enactment
of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of
200
2011, which codified the rule of unanimity, makes no mention of
201
the proper way to give consent. Correctly, the court reasoned that
through one of the canons of interpretation—legislative intent—
Congress could have specified the form of consent required for a
202
defendant who joins in the removal. Analyzing legislative intent
—using plain meaning, the purpose approach, and textualism—
shows that the court’s analysis was further substantiated. The court
in Griffioen could have analyzed another policy implication—an
attorney’s ethical challenges in terms of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. The application of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to the lawyers who sign and certify the notice
of removal pursuant to Rule 11 importantly supports the theory
203
that a single defendant may give consent for its codefendants.
This is shown by the threat of state bar disciplinary actions imposed
on an attorney who violates one of the Model Rules of Professional
204
Conduct. In a sense, the threat of bar disciplinary actions mimics
the policy implication for allowing a sole defendant to give consent
for its codefendants brought about by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
205
of Civil Procedure. Additionally, the policy implications of Rule
11 support the notion that a defendant may vouch for consent of
its codefendants, subject to a local rule certification that may
206
implicate sanctions.
In sum, the Eighth Circuit accurately analyzed § 1446 and the
consent requirement. However, the holding in Griffioen could
nonetheless lead to a misuse of the removal statute in an attempt to
207
force a defendant into federal court. Until the exact form of
consent is codified in statute, the consent requirement of the rule

199. See supra Section II.C.
200. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446).
201. See id.
202. See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187 (“Congress could have defined with equal
specificity the form of or time for consent but chose not to do so.”); supra notes
168–70 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 176–88 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 176–88 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
206. See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187.
207. See supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text.
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of unanimity will perpetually confound the courts that analyze
§ 1446 in a context similar to Griffioen.

